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TENTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE SERIES
FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW *
PRINCE ZEID RA’AD ZEID AL-HUSSEIN **
I will begin with two observations. The first is the well-accepted
understanding that any effort to separate law from the exercise of
political authority along neat, tidy lines is a challenge filled with
anxiety for those willing to try it—an embrace so complex, it far
exceeds my ability to attempt it. That being said, within our
experiences, there are circumstances that would seem to loosen some
of these knots and turn this interplay of politics and law, into a
simpler, clearer, although more tense, relationship.
One such condition is when political authority finds itself, or
supposes by virtue of probability it will eventually find itself, pitted
against the world of international law and, more specifically, the
world of individual criminal responsibility. And it is easy to see how
this may be.
I do not believe any one of us would doubt that humans are most
sensitive to the law when it is violated in the extreme. When human
suffering, particularly that of children, is so astonishing in its breadth
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** Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States of
America; Ph.D. Cambridge (Christ’s College); B.A. Johns Hopkins University. He
previously served as the Kingdom of Jordan’s Permanent Representative to the
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Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court; a position held until
2005.
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and so numbing in its ferocity, it arouses in us the most unambiguous
emotions. And when, in that specific context, suspicions edge up
against a particular individual holding office the battle-lines
distinguishing the world of law (however we choose to interpret it)
from the world that has clearly abandoned all law can sharpen and
the two worlds begin to reveal themselves with greater clarity.
That is not to say, of course, that the political world somehow
rallies in support of a monster who commits such offenses—far from
it. The perpetrator will often provoke howls of genuine
condemnation, heartfelt disgust, and calls for action to be taken from
political establishments everywhere. 1 But the political world will
also likely perceive, by virtue of analogous thinking and with some
imagination, that the modern day equivalents of the Barons at
Runnymede—the lawyers—often make more demands of the
political world than may yet be acceptable to the practitioners of
sovereign authority. 2
The second assertion that I wish to make early on in this Lecture is
that it is not states who legislate international law, nor is it states who
campaign for or negotiate international treaties and then seek
compliance with them. Rather, it is persons bearing names, with
personal histories and individual beliefs, who also happen to be the
representatives of these states, who do all of this: campaign for new
treaties, negotiate them, and seek compliance with them. I make this
point because it is astonishing how, to an ordinary diplomat like me, 3
it is so often lost in the mists of scholarly discussion. 4

1. See Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283, 284 (2007) (recognizing the evolution of the term
“crimes against humanity” from the atrocities of Nazi Germany and the
international war tribunals subsequently established in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda to address such impunities).
2. See, e.g., id. (noting that for some time the international community
“begrudgingly” accepted domestic amnesty programs as a redress for impunities,
thwarted by state leaders “wielding the shield of state sovereignty”).
3. Press Release, Embassy of Jordan, Prince Zeid Bin Ra'ad Begins New Post
as Jordan's Ambassador to the United States (Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/pr/pr02272007.shtml.
4. See generally Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law, in
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-44 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004)
(providing a refined analysis of the major schools of contemporary scholarship
covering the relationship between law and politics).
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In my own experience, success in treaty negotiations always
seemed to depend on the same three crucial ingredients: a
determination by at least a majority of states to have a treaty
negotiated, a well thought-out methodology for how this outcome
could best be achieved, and skilled lawyer-diplomats at hand to chair
the proceedings. By far the most important requirement, however,
was the presence of enough individual negotiators prepared to
unhinge their views from their initial instructions and then allow
those views to conform to the contours of an emerging consensus.
Without elasticity guided in some measure by one’s own conscience,
and a knitting together of friendships between the delegates, no
agreement, let alone a durable treaty, would be attainable. If every
negotiator stuck rigidly to the instructions of their respective
governments, without ceding ground on a single point to fellow
delegates, customary international law itself could never have been
codified.
I have chosen to make these two assertions because it is the
individual, not the state, who arouses fear and inspiration. It is the
individual who will, if accused of an outrage, invoke his or her
country’s name, its laws and honor, and the right of immunities
attaching to his or her sovereign office—even though the crimes for
which this figure is accused should properly extinguish all and every
argument serving their bid for impunity. It is the individual who will
see this from afar, and then seek to envelop himself with every
measure of national protection, placing his country between himself
and the outside world and its “world law.”
It is also the individual who will react to any flagrant abuse of
power, call for change, and seek the creation of a new legal
framework. The question is: are there enough individuals to make a
sustained difference?
In general terms, the legal community that serves political
authority directly too often sees itself merely as a technical service.
Skilled craftsmen employed by politicians who line the channels of
expediency with legal reasoning sufficient to ensure the triumph of
expediency or political freedom of action over everything else. 5 In

5. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 197 (2005) (describing modern skepticism
about international law as the belief that international law is normatively flexible
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the context of international relations, this point is as obvious as it is
ubiquitous.
I say this because in recognizing the state system as a legal
system, we also acknowledge that nationality is one of the principal
points of reference for us—one of the prime sources of our identity. 6
And, for many of us, as we make our way into the soup of
international affairs, it can indeed be “the” principal identity. To
borrow from the celebrated script of the late Abby Mann, we will do
much “for love of country;” 7 there is, after all, a genuine loyalty the
majority of us feel toward our respective national points of origin.
We often elect judges to international criminal tribunals solely
because our country has been offered a trade or reciprocal agreement
for another position it seeks elsewhere—with little consideration
given to the legal qualifications of the candidate. 8 We condemn
publicly the abuses committed by international peacekeeping
personnel, abuses that include the crimes of rape, the trafficking of
human beings and illicit narcotics, but we remain tight-lipped when
it is our own peacekeepers who commit them. 9 The lawyers often
and determined by that which is politically expedient).
6. In his book, Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny, Amartya Sen
demonstrates how our inclination to lay specific emphasis on only one or two of
the many identities or affiliations we enjoy (and for the most part he is concerned
with religious affiliations) can fall easy prey to those militants and chauvinists who
will exploit and catapult this popular tendency to an extreme wherein it begets
violence. He argues persuasively, the extent to which we must therefore broaden
our appreciation of whom we are. See AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE:
THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 83 (2006).
7. See ABBY MANN, JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 114 (1961) (telling the story
of the “Judges’ Trial” of 1947—the third of the twelve subsequent trials held in
Nuremberg).
8. See Adam M. Smith, “Judicial Nationalism” in International Law:
National Identity and Judicial Autonomy at the ICJ, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 197, 231
(2004-2005) (arguing that some considerations beyond the qualifications of a
particular judge, such as nationality, defy the notion of objectivity but may still
have good practical reasons for remaining a part of the international judicial
nomination process).
9. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 230
(2007) [hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT] (condemning the acts of
sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic
Republic of Congo), with Susan A. Notar, Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual
exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 413, 425-27 (2006) (outlining the
measures taken by the United States, such as the American Service Members
Protection Act, to prevent U.S. peacekeepers from being prosecuted in
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argue during the UN Security Council meetings or in other
gatherings of states’ parties that international criminal justice is too
expensive. The spending must be brought under control, they say,
knowing full well this is not their burden to carry, but that of their
compatriots representing the finance ministries with whom they seek
to curry favor. And when I say “we” or “the lawyers” I mean of
course all of us, generally speaking, with no reference intended to
any specific nationality.
Therefore, the problem presents itself clearly in the following way,
and other colleagues working in adjacent streams of government are
not unaware of this tendency. In the event the legal experts mount a
vigorous defense of broader legal principle, their arguments may
well be prone to ridicule, thus staining their credibility. 10 At the
extreme, we could very well be viewed as the inseparable
companions of hypocrisy.
This legal community, which in other circumstances would
practice and teach international law in all its variety, so often while
in the service of government, will rush to place its craft together with
its moral underpinnings—however amorphous their nature—high on
a scaffold for others to perform the public execution. There are the
few who would, of course, resign if policy ran roughshod over the
better interests of the legal profession or over general legal principle.
But so rare are these occurrences it is small wonder they then
become newsworthy and the lawyers concerned emerge from the
backrooms of government to become folk heroes.
In his seminal work on courage, Lord Moran observed almost a
century ago what seems so obvious to us now, that “[c]ourage is a
moral quality; it is not a chance gift of nature like an aptitude for
games. It is a cold choice between two alternatives . . . Courage is
will power.” 11 Because it requires a mental adjustment, an
understanding that courageous choices may include the loss of a job,
a career, freedom perhaps, sometimes friends, and even family, a
demonstration of moral courage can be rare indeed. And why all the

international tribunals).
10. Reus-Smit, supra note 4, at 15-16 (arguing that the pervasive realist view
of international politics draws a sharp line between the law and politics, where law
lacks significance without politics and the defense of the law outside of a political
context is inherently untenable).
11. LORD MORAN, THE ANATOMY OF COURAGE 61 (2d ed. 1966).
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sacrifice? Only to be comfortable in the knowledge that there is no
self-betrayal, that in advancing a position, there is a correctness, a
deeper purpose behind it, and also—fundamentally—a justness to it
(however we may interpret that justness). It is very much all
individual, as Sir Thomas More, that paragon of courage, well knew
the night of April 12, 1534: the eve of his dramatic declaration that
his own conscience would not allow him to swear the oath of
obedience, recognizing the recently passed Act of Succession. 12
Every prisoner of conscience before and since has surely also felt it.
As More spent his second month in the Tower of London, wedded to
his famous silence, the government knew it could ill-afford to act
against him unlawfully and therefore sought to impose the king’s
will “while preserving legalities.” 13 Over one year later, this was
done, courtesy of the judges who ensured, in the words of one
biographer: “tyranny succeeded not through war, but through law.” 14
I am always struck by the lessons of extremes and, in this vein, by
the experience of the White Rose movement in Germany in 1942 and
early 1943—a movement whose actions represent one of the purest
acts of heroism in the Second World War. 15
While there were many young men in Germany who, for love of
country, threw themselves into death’s embrace on the Eastern front
in 1942, there were many other men on the Eastern front, or with the
Einsatzgruppen, or in Poland—for example the 101 Reserve Police
Battalion—who, for the same love of country, engaged in the vilest
atrocities against civilian men, women, and children. 16 And of course
12. See RICHARD MARIUS, THOMAS MORE: A BIOGRAPHY 458-61 (1984)
(detailing the impact of the Act of Succession, which required all subjects to swear
an oath to recognize Elizabeth, daughter of King Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, as
the true successor to the crown and More’s subsequent refusal to swear an oath of
obedience to heirs produced by the marriage).
13. See id. at 479-82 (detailing the lengths to which the government went to
keep More in the Tower, such as changing the statute to encompass the charges
leveled against him).
14. See GERARD B. WEGEMER, THOMAS MORE: A PORTRAIT OF COURAGE 21017 (1995) (detailing the arguments and judgment made at More’s trial, including
the failure of the judges to address More’s defense).
15. See MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA 160 (Thomas
Dunlap trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998) (1994) (recognizing that the respect
due to the resistance fighters of the White Rose movement is made greater by the
fact that they knowingly broke valid law out of moral conviction, thereby
condemning themselves to death in the Nazi court system).
16. In Christopher Browning’s book, the actions of ordinary Germans
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there was the Holocaust: the mathematical killing of humanity itself,
with the perpetrators of these colossal crimes numbering in the tens
of thousands. Against all of this, there was the movement of the
White Rose, numbering at its core five students and a professor.
With the truth rapping loudly against their consciences, a truth
which held that Hitler’s state, as well as its wars, was a form of
monstrous criminality, these six Germans took to opposing the
regime by distributing copies of six leaflets throughout Germany,
filled with their exquisite denunciations. 17 Their courage, expressed
in the full knowledge of the sacrifice to be made if they were caught
at a time when almost all of the country appeared tranquillized, was
one of gigantic proportions. It was so, I believe because for them, the
victims of Nazi Germany had by November 1942 invaded the very
center of their thinking. 18 By displacing all other considerations,
including a love of country, the victims became the principal point of
reference for the members of the Movement, stimulating a yearning
for a country these members once knew as Germany.
It is often only when victims own this perspective completely, that
we can be moved as humans, and indeed respond as human beings.
Yet it is remarkable the extent to which this point is so often
obscured by other considerations.
Two years ago, I was Kofi Annan’s Adviser on Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping. After exploring the
phenomenon thoroughly for the United Nations, I was left feeling

committing the most unspeakable crimes is analyzed in great detail and from a
variety of angles. What emerges from his analysis is his conclusion that most of
the ordinary men of the Reserve Police Battalion 101, believing “their people” to
be in a race war against an objectified enemy threatening Germany, and
conditioned to accept, at a very fundamental level, “their Germanic Racial
Superiority”, committed mass murder willingly with few reservations.
CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101
AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND 73, 159-89, 191-92 (1992).
17. INGE SCHOLL, STUDENTS AGAINST TYRANNY: THE RESISTANCE OF THE
WHITE ROSE, MUNICH, 1942-1943 94-103 (Arthur R. Schultz trans., Wesleyan
Univ. Press 1970) (1952) (providing an eloquent and moving description
concerning the method of resistance chosen).
18. ANNETTE DUMBACH & JUD NEWBORN, SOPHIE SCHOLL AND THE WHITE
ROSE 190-92 (Oneworld Publications 2006) (1986) (reprinting the text of the
Second Leaflet, which called on German citizens to awaken from “their dull,
stupid sleep” to the atrocities committed by the German government and to accept
their complicity in these crimes by overthrowing the Nazis).
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numb by the extent to which people can be made to suffer. The
young women of Bunia, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
had survived the most gruesome wartime experiences—massacres,
multiple rapes, disease and hunger—only to then find themselves
tormented by the very people who were sent in to save them. It was
clear these people had endured unabashed cruelty.
We set about seeking to remedy every aspect of this odious
experience, including the United Nations’ investigation of the initial
allegations. After some time I had a conversation with a senior U.N.
official who opposed a recommendation that all personnel serving in
the field submit a sample of their DNA as they embarked on their
assignments on the understanding they would recover their sample
once they had completed their mission. 19 My friend, a very
distinguished lawyer, argued that some countries may view this
proposed measure as a violation of the civil and political rights of
their citizens serving with the United Nations. 20 Maybe so, I
remember saying, but I maintained that if the victims of U.N. abuse
were no longer considered an afterthought, but were properly
regarded, those fears ought to be the lesser of the two concerns.
Similarly, if the victims of U.N. abuse were properly treated today,
the negotiators at the United Nations, representing all our countries,
would by now have agreed to the mandatory holding of all courtmartials in the territorial or host state, whenever the accused came
from a military contingent. They would have allowed for joint
United Nations-member state investigations of alleged criminal
offenses. They would have agreed by now to the terms of a proposed
convention that would ensure jurisdictional coverage on the part of
the sending state whenever civilian personnel are suspected of
committing abuse and the host state has no functioning judiciary. For

19. See The Secretary General, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 15,
25-26, U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005) (prepared by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid
Al-Hussein) [hereinafter Zeid Report] (recommending that UN personnel be
subject to DNA testing if a question of paternity arises in the course of an
investigation or there is general suspicion that a criminal offense has occurred).
20. See Alexandra R. Harrington, Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations
Against U.N. Peacekeepers and the Role of Law in Preventing Them in the Future,
12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 125, 150 (2005-2006) (recognizing that DNA testing
prior to the deployment of UN peacekeepers may violate civil libertarian
principles, particularly in the United States).
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lawyers from the world’s respective defense establishments and
various ministries to think only of securing and defending the rights
of their own soldiers, of their own nationals, with little regard to the
victims thereof begs the rather obvious question: if not them, then
who? In the context of the present discussions at the United Nations
in New York, who will argue on behalf of the victims?
Is not this impulse, after all, identical to that which drives us
toward an acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect idea—the
generally welcomed notion that Governments have a duty to protect
their people and if they violate their obligations, erga omnes, the
international community may be required, or even obliged, to
intervene diplomatically or otherwise? 21 Three years ago, the
combined Heads of State and Government of all countries accepted
this logic, albeit more in the abstract than in operational terms. 22
However, at least they recognized the vulnerability of the individual
human being and the need for us to worry less about the rights of
those who torment and more about the suffering of their victims. Yet
the Responsibility to Protect, as a principle, is calibrated more to the
developing world and so finds easy acceptance within the developed
world. When it comes to abuses within the context of peacekeeping
activities, where the accused have in the past come from a broad
range of countries, North and South, resistance to any question of
improved accountability stiffens. 23
To return you to our original question: insofar as the advance of
international criminal law is concerned, are there a sufficient number
of lawyers to make a positive difference?
In the case of the International Criminal Court, the passions of a
decade ago, once raw, have ebbed somewhat, giving way to a more
studied approach to the Court’s performance. And all of us are the

21. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2002), available at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (elaborating in detail the founding
principles and state obligations of the Responsibility to Protect).
22. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005)
(committing the signatories to protecting “populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”).
23. See Alex de Waal, Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect,
83 INT’L AFF. 1039, 1054 (2007) (arguing that the failure of the Responsibility to
Protect in Darfur was the result of practical limitations not envisioned when the
policy was first formed).
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more relieved for it. However, and notwithstanding the caution still
exhibited by many countries toward the Court, there are two features
in particular that make it a truly historic institution. The first feature
is captured elegantly by Article twenty-seven of the Rome Statute:
now often overlooked, but still the simplest and most profound
article ever to be written into a multilateral treaty, or any other treaty
for that matter.
This golden article of the Rome Statute represents the field over
which the battle between law and politics was joined, with each
discipline exerting its influence over the question of whether there
should be a Court in the first place.
It is worth recalling the whole article:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
parliament, an elected representative or a government official
shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility
under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a
ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to
the official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person. 24
The irrelevance of official capacity, as a statutory principle, has
now been accepted by the 108 states across the international
community who have acceded to the Rome Statute, thereby
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over the four so-called “core
crimes,” or as my distinguished discussant Ambassador David
Scheffer has more accurately termed them the “atrocity crimes”—
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and the soon-tobe defined Crime of Aggression. 25 Put another way, 108 countries
have voluntarily placed, not just their citizenry but also their highest
officials, every single one of them, under the jurisdiction of an

24. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15- July 17, 1998, Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
25. Id., art. 5.
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international criminal court. 26 It is a step so enlightened it simply has
no historical equivalent or precedent. No matter what the nature of
the remaining criticisms directed at the court or its statute, one has to
admire the nerve of those countries acceding to the Rome Statute.
Others may call this naiveté, recklessness or even folly, and they
would bring forward their repertoire of arguments: the inevitable
corruptibility of court officials, no clear accountability, unchecked
prosecutorial powers, and so forth.
But these arguments bear some importance only when the victims
of those gravest of offenses are marginal to the discussion. In any
final analysis, we build a criminal court for the victims: because it is
they, and their kin, who ultimately will decide whether a society will
ever fully recover from the brutalities of war. No country or society
can possibly claw itself into lasting reconciliation once massive
crimes have been committed if the victims and their views are not
addressed as a central priority of the country and of the international
community. In this, the International Criminal Court is rather unique,
and this is my second point about its historic quality. Only a few
weeks ago, and for the first time in an international court, the pretrial chamber cleared the way for victims to take part in hearings, not
as witnesses but as victims in their own right. 27 And for the first time
there is an International Criminal Court with a statute that not only
provides for reparations, but also is in possession of a trust fund,
managed by a Board, from which so-called humanitarian payments
could be provided to victims in advance of a conviction if the Board
deems it necessary and the Court has no objection to it. 28
When the victims no longer exert any direct influence on our
discussions of international justice or peace after war, we often find
26. See International Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/ Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2009)
(listing member states, which include Brazil, France, Germany, Japan and the
United Kingdom).
27. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01-04-101,
Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1,
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 41 (Jan. 17, 2006) (determining
that the six victims of crimes including torture, unlawful detention, murder of
family members, and enslavement had a right to “participate in the proceedings at
the stage of investigation of the situation in the DRC”).
28. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 79 (establishing a trust fund for the
benefit of the victims of crimes tried in the International Criminal Court as well as
their families).
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ourselves entering into a world of interminable debate, with valid
arguments being presented from every direction. 29 For anyone who
has experienced war and its horrors, however, these discussions can
often appear to be in need of more subdued reflection.
It is my belief that if one seeks to patrol the currents of
international criminal law, one ought to know as best one can, what it
is they are patrolling. When it comes to crimes committed in war or
against humanity as a whole, more lawyers, I believe, need to be in
the war or be where these crimes find expression, to grasp, very
simply, the thinnest slice of what a victim experiences.
It is not the same as claiming, in an ordinary context, that one
must witness a murder to know the pain of the victim; we know
enough about what a murder is without actually needing to see such a
crime unfold before us. However, when we talk or write about
atrocity crimes, there is a more pressing need for us to feel firsthand
the extent to which the environment contributes toward the suffering
of the potential victim (quite aside from the physical deprivations
they experience), like the immobilizing fear associated with not
knowing if, or when, their turn to bear the incomprehensible will
come. And it is incomprehensible, even to those who have devoted
their lives to the criminal sciences. Perhaps one of the best
descriptions to be found anywhere lies in the case prosecuted in 1947
by Benjamin Ferencz: the Einsatzgruppen trial. In its judgment the
Nuremberg Criminal Tribunal found that:
If what the prosecution maintains is true, we have here
participation in a crime of such unprecedented brutality and
of such inconceivable savagery that the mind rebels against
its own thought image and the imagination staggers in the
contemplation of a human degradation beyond the power of
language to adequately portray. 30

29. In some of the earlier pieces of scholarship on the International Criminal
Court long essays were devoted to exposing the perceptions and desires of the
delegates who negotiated the statute with commendable, but not always with
complete, accuracy. Unfortunately, many of these scholars in their early writings
also omitted the centrality of victims in shaping our perceptions as delegates to the
Rome Conference and in the overriding need to extinguish impunity from the
world for the most barbaric of crimes. See, e.g., David Wippman, The
International Criminal Court, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151-68
(Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004).
30. 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under
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Indeed, if asked today, many of the distinguished judges at either
of the two ad hoc international tribunals would probably
acknowledge that a career filled with exposure to ordinary crimes is
little preparation for the surprise and revulsion they feel when
encountering the foulest of criminal extremes.
If lawyers could collect these impressions from actual experience
and then embroider them with the calmer reasoning offered by
distance, they will invariably, in my experience, place the victims
where they should be placed: firmly at the center of the debate on
international justice, and place themselves among those who
advocate passionately for international criminal justice.
As a Court whose purpose it is to rid the world of impunity for
those who will commit such offenses, with a statute that does not
recognize amnesties or pardons, the ICC gives no leeway for those
bearing the gravest responsibility. And for good reason: witness the
reversal or repudiation of a significant number of the amnesties
granted in Latin-America through the 1970s and 1980s. 31 Even the
Inter-American Court has discredited most, if not all, of them in
recent years. 32
To build stable societies after the compressions of war or extreme
violence, the first threads of a national memory need assembly, using
accountability as the first cornerstone. Any thought that carefully
applied amnesia is sufficient to create smooth and durable transitions
to peace is playing a game of high chance, because the tensions and
bitterness will lie like dry gunpowder waiting only for that
charismatic chauvinist to arrive on the political scene and light it.
The Court serves to retrieve memory from trauma, and therefore to
allow an injured society the indulgence of believing a full recovery is
possible. Notwithstanding the general hesitation of lawyers in
government service when it comes to the challenges expediency
poses to international law, there are still enough individuals who
understand the extraordinary nature of the International Criminal
Control Council No. 10, at 412 (1951) [hereinafter Nuernberg Trials].
31. See Trumbull, supra note 1, at 302-03 (observing that the blanket amnesties
granted by Chile and Peru were invalidated and that those states granting amnesty
combined amnesty with other forms of accountability).
32. See, e.g., id. at 300 (noting that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
found Peru’s amnesty law legally invalid and in violation of the American
Convention on Human Rights).
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Court and the centrality of victims in its construction and operation.
It is these individuals, scattered across the international community,
who have essentially built the Court and who, while entirely loyal to
their own governments, are able also to identify and sympathize with
the suffering of people elsewhere.
Over the last several years, there have been numerous attacks
mounted against international criminal justice from humanitarian
groups and political experts who believe that without the inducement
of amnesties, now effectively proscribed by the International
Criminal Court, conflicts are doomed to continue until they exhaust
themselves or one party prevails decisively over the other. 33 In a
major international conference held in Nuremburg last June, where
the entire agenda was devoted to this issue, this displeasure was well
felt. 34 In attendance were government lawyers drawn from all five
continents, who parried off these assaults as best as they could.
What appeared more important to me than the outcome (the
lawyers won of course) was that they were not arguing as German
lawyers, nor as Jordanian lawyers or as Finns, but only as lawyers.
And the foundation of their position was also clear: the world had
already crossed the Rubicon. Prior to July 2002, and the entry into
force of the Rome Statute, impunity flourished in the oxygen
supplied by amnesties: amnesties which were almost always enacted
by actors who themselves were never the victims. After the entry into
force of the statute, that condition has been more difficult to obtain
(the UN, for example, does not now support amnesties) and so the
world must continue to adjust to it, as it has done in more limited
cases in the past. 35

33. See Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice:
Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 871 (2005-2006) (asserting that amnesties and other
alternatives, like South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, should still
be considered by the ICC because the alternatives may be a better way to do
justice, avoid harm to third parties, and adopt a pluralist philosophy).
34. See U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess., Letter dated 13 June 2008 from the Permanent
Representatives of Finland, Germany, and Jordan to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General at Annex, ¶ 2.6, U.N. Doc A/62/885 (June 19, 2008)
(transmitting the final Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, which was
developed at an international conference in Nuremberg and includes a compromise
that permits amnesties in certain circumstances for those not primarily responsible
for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes).
35. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at pmbl. (calling for the end of impunity
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I last spoke at this annual meeting in August, 2005 and on that
occasion I began with a recollection that I will now use toward the
end of my statement for this evening. And I will do so because, to
my mind, it demonstrates the extent to which law can reframe an
entire approach when it is left to operate according to its own logic;
not as the mere servant of political expediency, but at the service of a
broader need. Often it does need a champion, a leader; although it is
also accepted that the individual in question may not even be aware
they are viewed as such.
On April 24, 1995, Justice Richard Goldstone, the Chief
Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, announced he was investigating Radovan Karadžić,
Ratko Mladić, and Mico Stanisić for Genocide and Crimes Against
Humanity. For those of us in the former Yugoslavia, inured into
believing that justice had no friend in a land where expediency on the
part of the United Nations and much of the international community
reigned supreme, the news burst like a thunderclap. I offer no great
revelation this evening when I note how the announcement was not
popular with certain major capitals, notwithstanding the continued
high levels of bloodletting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, there
were many in the United Nations who panicked over the prospect of
no further talks with the Bosnian Serb leadership. How, they
wondered, were we going to end the war now, if we could no longer
negotiate with the likes of Karadžić and Mladić?
Goldstone, acting very much against the conventional expectations
of the time, courageously and in one stroke forced us to think
differently. One month later, the Tribunal issued its first indictments
of both Karadžić and Mladić. While they did not prevent the
nightmare of Srebrenica, nor did they lead to the arrest of Karadžić
and Mladić (a fact that has kept Bosnia and Herzegovina in this state
of insecurity for so long), they did open the way for NATO and
subsequently Dayton and the end to the fighting itself by October
1995. 36
for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes).
36. Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the
First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 874
(1997) (underscoring Justice Goldstone’s belief that peace agreements cannot be
successful without simultaneous accountability for war criminals, and, as such, the
indictment of Karadzic was a crucial step in attaining peace in the former
Yugoslavia).
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President Bill Clinton and his administration, as well as the North
Atlantic Council, were accorded great credit for bringing the
hostilities to an end, and rightly so. They brought, through their
combined will and effort, the bitter killing to an end. 37 Nevertheless,
the war’s final chapter began with the launch of specific criminal
investigations ordered by an international prosecutor, who brought
his office into action on the basis of evidence gathered by his
investigators and at a time when any such judicial intervention was
viewed by many political experts as needlessly complicating, if not
naive. These experts were wrong of course. And the world adjusted
itself to Goldstone’s reality.
It is at this type of juncture, though not always at the threshold I
just described, when the world of political expediency will
acknowledge that its methods have failed and so reluctantly make
room for another non-political approach. This movement will be
made reluctantly, because, as I suggested at the beginning of this
talk, if successful, others would ask, with suspicion, where this
march of international criminal law would ultimately lead.
Is it not a measure of how small we can be when all some have to
offer the victims of the most terrible offenses is little more than the
hypothetical question: yes, but what would happen if? If the
International Criminal Court succeeded, what would happen then?
What would it mean for the future exercise of political power, given
these first assaults on the right to sovereign immunity? Ultimately,
the question also arises as to whether it all has to be so dramatic or
cast in language so threatening?
Is it not possible for us to imagine a vibrant political world, free of
our most extreme and violent excesses and iniquities? Can we not
accomplish this by supporting the only permanent international
criminal court without sacrificing that political power necessary for
any country to provide its people a dignified existence? Are the
political powers we judge indispensable to the preservation of that
dignity and the Right to Sovereign immunity one and the same
thing? Under ordinary circumstances, perhaps the answer is yes, but
surely not so if the country in question hosts or commits crimes
37. WAYNE BERT, THE RELUCTANT SUPERPOWER 224 (1997) (arguing that
despite the Clinton Administration’s initial reluctance to use military power, the
United State’s use of force was critical to stopping the advancement of the Serbs
and providing an impetus for successful negotiations).
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whose description lies “beyond the power of language to adequately
portray.” 38 Such an authority forfeits not only the dignity of its
people, but every fiber of its legitimacy.
All 108 heads of state and governments of the states party to the
Rome Statute have accepted this maxim; while they continue to
maintain their rights to sovereign immunities in all other matters, this
right is suspended where atrocity crimes are in evidence. They are
not all unrestrained idealists, and the world will long remain
imperfect. But they acknowledge by their actions that we can no
longer offer license to impunity through the perversion of a
customary right when human conduct turns barbarous.
We, the politicians and diplomats, will better preserve the dignity
of our people not by clinging steadfast to whatever right will shield
us from our political foes, but by some resort to moral courage and
enlightened thought, and it does not have to be at the expense of
expediency. The restoration and maintenance of peace and
security—the basic grammar of our international work—does not
flow simply from raw security, nor from the physical reconstruction
of societies shredded by war, but from what the victims themselves
will allow us or decide for us. It is the victims of our worst excesses,
their kin and their immediate descendents, who determine the
durability of peace agreements, or whether a return to war is likely.
Serve them well, serve their desire for accountability, for
recognition, for dignity and the political world will have what it
wants most: a reckoning, the essential precursor to a lasting
reconciliation, and then security, stability and, ultimately,
predictability.
It is also the victims who can bind us individuals within our
respective countries, all of us, lawyers and non-lawyers, not just in
common recognition of their terrible misfortune, but, should we
genuinely seek it, in our resolve and effort to restore to them some
basic sense of human decency. And the equation could not be
simpler; we place these victims high within the configuration of our
government priorities, and they, in turn, elevate our own sense of
community and the very worth of the state we serve before humanity
as a whole.

38. Nuernberg Trials, supra note 30, at 412.
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If any country is worthy of the love of its people, surely it is the
country distinguishing itself among all of the 193 countries in the
world today by offering humanity a more mature and hopeful future.
If not for my own, Ladies and Gentlemen, then for love of that
country and to it, would I wish to belong.

